股东治理会影响债券信用利差吗?——基于多个大股东的视角

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Bonds Credit Spreads

利用2007-2018年上市公司在交易所公开发行的公司债数据检验发现,多个大股东的存在会降低债券信用利差。相较于一股独大的发债公司,当存在多个大股东,公司债信用利差下降11个BP,在潜在利差均值基础上下降约5%。公司治理水平越差、面临更严峻的融资约束、所处信息环境越差,多个大股东对信用利差的抑制作用更显著。本研究在丰富股东治理及债券信用利差研究领域文献的同时,对发债公司、投资者及政府监管部门也具有重要启示意义。

Using the corporate bonds data publicly issued by listed companies on exchange market from 2007 to 2018,We find that the existence of multiple large shareholders will reduce bond credit spreads.When there is a non-controlling large shareholder,the credit spread of corporate bonds decreases by 11 BP,which is about 5%lower than the average potential spread.What’s more,the worse the corporate governance level,the more severe the financing constraints,and the worse the information environment,the more significant the non-controlling shareholder's alleviating effect on credit spreads.While adding to the literature of shareholder governance and bond spread research,this study also has important implications for bond issuers,investors,and regulators.