供应链协同视角的联合促销演化博弈分析

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Joint Promotion from the Perspective of Supply Chain Synergy

制造商和零售商联合促销产生协同效应影响供应链成员的策略选择.利用演化博弈模型研究了制造商和零售商联合促销互动进程中的演化路径,并仿真了初始意愿、协同效应、促销补助等参数对演化系统的影响.研究表明:协同效应高于一定值才能形成制造商和零售商稳定的联合促销;如果制造商对零售商的处罚收入小于促销投入且零售商促销额外收益不能弥补促销费用时,制造商和零售商的初始意愿影响联合促销稳定演化路径.随着协同效应的提高,演化系统收敛速度先提高后下降.联合促销协同效应一定时,制造商对零售商的促销补助和处罚均存在最优值.

The synergy effect of manufacturers and retailers’joint promotion affects the strategic choice of supply chain members.Using evolutionary game model,this paper studies the evolutionary path in the process of joint promotion interaction between manufacturers and retailers,and simulates the influence of initial intention,synergy effect,promotion subsidy and other parameters on the evolutionary system.The results show that only when the synergy is higher than a certain value can a stable joint promotion be formed between the manufacturer and the retailer.If the manufacturer’s penalty income to the retailer is less than the promotion input and the retailer’s extra promotion income can’t make up the promotion cost,the initial intention of the manufacturer and the retailer will affect the stable evolution path of the joint promotion.With the increase of synergy effect,the convergence rate of evolutionary system increases first and then decreases.When the synergy effect of joint promotion is certain,the manufacturer has the best value for the retailer’s promotion subsidy and punishment.