基于筛选效应的劳工标准移植研究

Research on Labor Standard Transplant Based on Screening Effect

较多中国制造企业借助劳工标准认证筛选效应嵌入全球价值链分工,且其筛选效应在认证与非认证企业间呈现不同特征和机制。本文基于中国贸易制度高质量发展背景,从理论上探究中国企业劳工标准的筛选效应作用机制。研究发现,信息不对称使得更多劳工认证企业需要过度投资达到劳工标准"筛选"效应,且这样的标签筛选满足一定条件才可从较低标准混同到分离均衡;市场机制使得具有不同筛选要求的认证与非认证企业,在竞争中会达到企业劳工标准内生筛选均衡。劳工标准认证又会在一定的时间通过内在相关规则约束及持续改进的正反馈机制产生生产效应,最后的净收益取决于因时间贴现、生产磨合等带来筛选成本与进一步生产效率提高的综合效果。

More Chinese manufacturing enterprises are embedded in the international division of labor in global value chains through labor certification,and the screening effect presents different characteristics and mechanisms between certified and non-certified companies.Based on the high-quality development background of Chinese trade system,this paper theoretically explores the mechanism of screening effect of Chinese enterprise labor standards.The study finds that information asymmetry makes more labor certification companies need to over-invest in the“screening”effect of labor standards,and such label screening can meet certain conditions before mixing from lower standards to separating equilibrium;Market mechanism makes it possible for certified and non-certified companies with different screening requirements to reach the endogenous screening equilibrium of the company's labor standards in the competitive equilibrium.Labor standards certification will produce production effect within certain period of time through the positive feedback mechanism of internal related rules and continuous improvement.The final net income depends on the comprehensive effect of time discounting,production run-in and other screening costs and further production efficiency improvement.