新时代背景下国企高管权力制衡的研究

Research on the Power Balance of State-owned Enterprise Executives in the New Era

国企自身的特征容易导致公司出现治理结构不完善、所有者缺位、委托代理等问题。不完善的公司治理结构使董事会、监事会、管理层及职工之间不能各司其职,委托代理问题中代理链条过长加剧了委托人和代理人之间信息不对称程度,为高管滥用权力为自己谋取利益提供了条件,国企所有者缺位使得虚拟的"所有者"对高管的监督缺乏动机,内部监督机制不健全也是导致国企高管权力失衡的原因之一。研究认为应该结合十九大提出的"坚持党对一切工作的领导"的精神,加强党组织和职代会在国企治理中的参与度,通过明晰产权主体和补全所有者缺位,建立动态的权力配置机制和实施相应激励措施缩短委托代理链条,建立有效的内部监督机制,以期合理有效配置高管的权力。

The characteristics of state-owned enterprises can easily lead to imperfect corporate governance structure、absence of owners and principal-agent problems,The imperfect governance structure prevents the board of directors,the board of supervisors,the management and the staff from performing their respective duties,In the principal-agent problem,the long agency chain aggravates the degree of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent,which leads to the state-owned enterprise executives to abuse their power to seek profits for themselves,At the same time,the absence of owners in state-owned enterprises makes the virtual"owners"lack motivation to supervise the executives,and the imperfect internal supervision mechanism is also one of the reasons for the imbalance of power among executives in state-owned enterprises.In conjunction with the 19 th national congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC),which proposed to"uphold the party’s leadership in all work",We will strengthen the participation of party organizations and workers’congresses in the governance of state-owned enterprises,clarify the subject of property rights and make the subject of investment diversify to fill the vacancy of the owner,establish a dynamic power allocation mechanism and implement corresponding incentive measures to shorten the principal-agent chain,and establish an effective internal supervision mechanism,so as to reasonably and effectively balance the power of senior executives.