政府补助与产能过剩企业费用粘性:强化还是弱化?

Government Subsidies and Costs Stickiness of Overcapacity Enterprise:Strengthen or Weaken?

产能过剩制约经济稳步增长,化解过剩产能是供给侧结构性改革的首要任务,政府补助发挥了政策引导的作用。以2012-2017年产能过剩企业为对象,实证检验政府补助与产能过剩企业费用间的关系,研究结果表明,产能过剩企业存在费用粘性,政府补助整体上强化了费用粘性。具体来看,政府补助强化了地方国有性质、民营性质及内部控制弱的产能过剩企业费用粘性,而在中央国有性质与内部控制强的产能过剩企业中表现不明显,结论将为精准实施政府补助政策提供参考。

Overcapacity has constrained economic growth steadily,so cutting overcapacity is the primary task of supply-side structural reform.Government subsidies have played a guiding role.Taking surplus capacity enterprises from 2012 to 2017 as the object,this paper empirically tests the relationship between government subsidies and the costs of excess capacity enterprises.The research results show that excess capacity enterprises have cost stickiness,and government subsidies strengthen the cost stickiness on the whole.Specifically,government subsidies strengthen the cost stickiness of local state-owned,private and internal control weaknesses excess capacity enterprises,while they are not obvious in central state-owned and sound internal controlling excess capacity enterprises.The conclusion could provide some reference for the accurate implementation of government subsidy policies.