《孟子》和郭店楚简《性自命出》的性论

Discourses on Xing (Human nature) in the Xingzimingchu and the Mencius

本文即基于研究郭店楚简等20世纪末年问世的新出土文献而获得的新知见,探讨孟子性善论形成过程的一系列论考之最初部分。本文首先提出笔者对孟子性善论的看法,以为后续探讨的展开打住基础。在此笔者所要论证的是孟子在思维方式上有何种特色。笔者将厘清孟子在"可不可"和"欲不欲"之间并没有设立区分,而只是比较各种"欲不欲"的情形以选择其中比较理想的"欲"。其实,为了这样思路的成立,其背后还可以设想"选择之齐一性"(人会有同欲的倾向)以及"性之齐一性"(凡性属同一)两种"齐一性"思维,而孟子的性善论就是在此两种"齐一性"的前提上建构出来的。在此理解的基础上,笔者又试图论证《性自命出》的"性"论,一方面具有与孟子性善论类似的论述构造,另一方面是在所谓"性即气"的思维方式上建构出来的。

This article is the first in a series from my study about the formation of Mencius’ s theory of "Human nature is good." I have also accessed the Guodian Chu Bamboo manuscript,Xingzimingchu, which was excavated in the early 1990 s. My study aims to focus on Mencius’ s way of thinking. I elucidate some characteristics that form the backbone of his discourse that human nature is good. Mencius does not distinguish the concept of "One wants to do or not" from "One should do or not." What needs to be chosen as an ideal, according to Mencius, is what one wants most, among others. I also attempt to demonstrate that such an argument is based on two premises:(1) human beings have a tendency to choose the thing they want to have;and(2) human nature is common across individuals. Such an idea helps elucidate the characteristics of the Xinzimingchu, which states that human nature arises from the Mandate of Heaven. Xinzimingchu also has a similarity to the views of Mencius, who observed that there is another way of thinking in which xing("goodness of human nature") should equal to qi("vital breath/energy").