以旧换新与以旧换再共存时政府最佳补贴决策研究

Subsidy Policies Under the Coexistence of“Trade Old for New”and“Trade Old for Remanufactured”Programs

针对制造商同时开展以旧换新和以旧换再的情形,本文构建了政府和制造商两阶段博弈模型,研究了3种不同情形下,闭环供应链中政府最佳补贴决策与制造商最佳定价决策,并对比分析了不同情形下的市场需求、社会福利、制造商利润以及环境效益。结果表明:当政府以社会福利最大化为目标时,应该同时补贴以旧换新和以旧换再。当政府以保护环境、增强环境效益为目标,或者以促进再制造行业的发展为目标时,应该只补贴以旧换再。当政府以促进新产品更新换代,刺激新产品消费需求为目标时,应该只补贴以旧换新。

For the case of trade-old-for-new and trade-old-for-remanufactured programs implemented simultaneously by one manufacturer,the two-stage model between government and manufacturer is developed to explore how the government should make TON and TOR subsidy decisions.The government’s optimal subsidy decision and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing decision can be obtained from the models.The results show that when the government’s goal is to maximize social welfare,TON and TOR should be subsidized at the same time.When the government’s goal is to improve environmental efficiency or expand the scale of the remanufacturing industry,only TOR subsidy should be provided.When the government’s goal is to expand the market size of new products,it should only provide TON subsidy.