存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

On Whether the Deposit Insurance System Restrain Individual Risk Taking of Banks

基于2008—2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响。对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量。利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响不大,但显著提升了股份制商业银行和城市商业银行的风险承担行为;在银行个体异质性方面,存贷比和净资产收益率越高的银行存款保险制度对其风险承担行为的促进作用越强,资本充足率则相反。

Based on the financial data of 30 listed banks in China from 2008 to 2019,this paper studies the impact of the implementation of deposit insurance system on bank risk-taking behavior.The unit root test of the selected economic variables shows that the variables are all stationary variables.The empirical regression analysis using the fixed effect model shows that:overall,the introduction of deposit insurance system increases the risk-taking behavior of banks;after classifying banks,the implementation of deposit insurance system has little impact on the risk-taking of large commercial banks,but significantly improves the risk-taking behavior of joint-stock banks and city commercial banks;in terms of individual heterogeneity of banks,the higher the loan-to-deposit ratio and the return on net assets of banks,the stronger the promotion effect of deposit insurance system on their risk-taking behavior,while the capital adequacy ratio is the opposite.