股权性质差异下股权质押、高管风险偏好与盈余管理

Study on Equity Pledge, Executive Risk Preference and Earnings Management under the Difference of Ownership Nature

以2007—2017年深沪两市上市公司为经验数据,对股权质押、股权性质、高管风险偏好以及盈余管理几者之间的关系进行探讨,研究结果显示:存在股权质押行为的公司,其盈余管理水平相对较低;股权性质会对这两者间的关系起反向调节作用,国有企业中股权质押对盈余管理的降低作用更不显著;股权性质的调节效应是有中介的调节,即股权性质的调节效应部分是通过高管风险偏好产生的。

Based on the empirical data of listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2007 to2017, this paper discusses the relationship among equity pledge, equity nature, risk preference of executives and earnings management. The results show that:(1) companies with equity pledge behavior have a relatively low earnings management level;(2) the nature of equity will reversely regulate the relationship between the two, and the effect of equity pledge on earnings management in state-owned enterprises is even less significant;(3) the regulatory effect of equity nature is achieved through an intermediary. That’s to say, the regulatory effect of equity nature is partly generated by the risk preference of senior managers.