碳排放权分配对碳市场成本有效性的影响研究

Assessing the impact of emission permit allocation on the cost eflTectiveness of carbon market

交易成本和市场势力影响碳市场成本有效性,不同的碳排放权分配方法是否造成不等的碳市场效率损失?本文构建碳交易机制下企业决策模型,探究交易成本、市场势力存在时,碳排放权分配方法的选择对碳市场成本有效性的影响.研究发现:1)交易成本中交易佣金会导致碳市场效率损失,基准法和祖父法的影响程度小于拍卖法;2)碳市场存在市场势力时,祖父法和基准法导致的碳市场效率损失小于拍卖法;3)当碳市场同时存在交易成本和市场势力时,市场势力进一步加剧了交易成本导致的碳市场效率损失,祖父法和基准法导致的增加损失小于拍卖法.本文建议政策制定者采用祖父法或者基准法对市场势力企业进行碳排放权分配,并取消交易佣金.

Transaction cost and market power affect the cost effectiveness of carbon markets.Will different carbon emission permit allocation methods result in different efficiency losses?This paper explores whether the choice of emission permit allocation method affects the cost effectiveness of ETS when transaction cost and market power exist in the carbon market.Our theoretical model shows that transaction cost leads to the efficiency loss of ETS and that the efficiency loss from benchmarking and grandfathering are less than auctioning.When there is only market power in the carbon market,the efficiency loss is proportional to the gap between the market power firm,s carbon emissions and its free emission permits.If both transaction cost and market power exist in the carbon market,market power further exacerbates the efficiency loss caused by transaction cost.The additional efficiency loss caused by grandfathering and benchmarking are less than that by auctioning.Policy makers are suggested to apply grandfathering or benchmarking to allocating emission permits to firms with market power and to cancel transaction-based fee in the carbon market.