绿色制造水平为隐匿信息的政府基金征收激励契约设计

Incentive mechanism for government fund collection with hidden green manufacturing level

基于制造商产品绿色制造水平引起的逆向选择问题,及制造商努力程度引起的道德风险问题,运用激励理论研究了政府与制造商的废弃电器电子产品基金征收激励契约,设计了混同契约和分离契约,并给出了两类契约实施的前提条件,比较了混同契约与分离契约的激励效果。讨论了各相关因素对契约的影响,提出能获得信息租金的制造商类型,最后通过数值仿真分析了契约双方的期望收益与各相关因素的关系。研究表明:混同契约无激励作用,分离契约能有效甄别制造商类型并实现高效度激励。研究结论对政府环境规制设计和制造商绿色发展战略制定具有参考价值。

Aiming at the problem of adverse selection caused by manufacturer’s green manufacturing level and the problem of moral hazard caused by manufacturer’s effort level,the incentive contract between the manufacturer and the government,which was implemented in collection fund for the disposal of waste electrical and electronic products was designed with the incentive theory of motivation.The screening contract and the pooling contract were given,and the prerequisites for implementation of both contracts were proposed respectively.The incentive effects of the two types of contracts were compared.The influences of various correlative factors on two contracts were discussed.The type of manufacturer that could get the information rent was proposed.More discussion was conducted to investigate the relationships between various factors and the contractual parties’expected profits with a numerical simulation.The results indicated that the proposed screening contract was effective to achieve the manufacturers’type screening and the high-validity motivation,and the pooling contract had no incentive for manufacturers.The conclusions were helpful for the making of government’s environmental regulations and the manufacturer’s green development strategy.