“简政放权”与僵尸企业出清:以投资审批制度改革为例

“Streamlining Administration and Delegating Power”and Clearing Zombie Enterprises:An Example from the Reform of Investment Approval System

本文基于2004年投资审批制度改革这一准自然实验,采用双重差分法实证检验了投资审批制度改革对僵尸企业出清的影响及内在机理。研究表明,投资审批制度改革能够使各行业僵尸企业比例平均下降15.4%。这一结果源于该项改革带来的竞争效应和规模效应显著增强了僵尸企业的自生能力:一方面降低了企业制度性交易成本、催生新的市场主体,提升了企业创新能力;另一方面推动了企业规模的扩张和市场容纳能力的增强,显著改善了企业全要素生产率。此外,与民营企业和竞争性行业不同,国有企业和垄断性行业的特殊性弱化了这项改革的效果。本文的研究为短期内通过市场机制对僵尸企业进行分类处置提供了有益参考,也为长期中通过深化行政体制改革根除僵尸企业滋生的土壤提供了启示。

Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the reform of investment approval system in2004 and DID method,this paper estimates the influence of the reform on zombie enterprises.The results show that the reform reduced the proportion of zombie enterprises by 15.4%on average.The competition effect and scale effect that the reform brought refreshed the zombie enterprises:On the one hand,the competition effect increased the enterprises’innovation ability by reducing institutional transaction cost and promoting new entry.On the other hand,the scale effect expanded the enterprises,increased the market capacity,and improved the enterprises’total factor productivity.Heterogeneity analysis shows that contrary to private enterprises and competitive industries,state-owned enterprises and monopolistic industries weaken the effect of the reform.The research provides enlightenment for dealing with zombie enterprises in the short rum and eradicating their basement in the long run.