独生子女的信任歧视及其来源:来自经济学实验的证据

Trust Discrimination of the Only Children and Its Source:Evidence from an Economics Experiment

自1982年实施独生子女政策以来,中国已产生了约一亿五千万独生子女,但是,人们对独生子女群体往往持有负面的刻板印象。本文探究信任实验中参与者的独生或非独生子女身份,对实验中信任者的信任行为和受信者的值得信任行为的影响。本文还进一步考察了凸显信任者身份对信任行为的边际影响。研究结果表明,首先,不论是否凸显身份,独生受信者均遭到非独信任者的信任歧视;但仅当凸显身份时,独生受信者才会遭到独生信任者的歧视。第二,无论受信者为独生还是非独身份以及无论信任者的身份是否被凸显,不同身份信任者之间的信任行为均无差异。第三,信任歧视来自统计性歧视。第四,进一步的反事实估计表明,纠正信任者对返还额的错误估计会提升他们对独生和非独受信者的信任并减轻其对独生子女受信者的歧视。

Since China implementing the One-Child Policy in the late 1970s,more than 150 million only children have been born.Nevertheless,they are often stigmatized with negative stereotypes.This paper discusses the impact of one-child identity on both trustors’trust and trustees’trustworthiness through an experiment.It also examines the marginal impact of highlighting trustors’identities.The results show that:Firstly,the sibling-child trustors distrust the only-child trustees,whether the identities are highlighted or not;when stressing the identities,the only-child trustors would discriminate the only-child trustees.Secondly,whatever the identities are and whether they are highlighted or not,there is no difference in trust behavior between the only-child and the sibling-child trustors.Thirdly,trust discrimination is a kind of statistical discrimination.Lastly,a counterfactual analysis further illustrates that correcting trustors’belief will enhance trust and mitigate the discrimination against the only-child trustees.