临时CEO与企业并购——基于我国上市公司的经验证据

Interim CEO and Merger and Acquisitions:Evidence from China’s Listed Companies

选取2010—2015年我国资本市场非金融类上市公司为样本,实证分析临时CEO对上市公司并购频率和并购效率的影响。研究发现:相比正式CEO,临时CEO倾向于实施更少的并购交易,但并购效率更高;与本地并购相比,临时CEO倾向于进行更少的异地并购,且异地并购的效率更低。进一步研究表明:在上市公司领取薪酬的临时CEO和企业内部委任的临时CEO更倾向于降低并购活动的频率,但并购效率更高;当并购双方不全为国有企业时,临时CEO实施的并购活动更少,但并购效率更高。

This paper analyzes the impact of interim CEO on the frequency and efficiency of mergers and acquisitions based on the sample of China’s non-financial listed companies from 2010 to 2015.The results show that interim CEOs tend to make fewer M&A transactions,but the efficiency of M&A is higher,when compared to formal CEO.When compared to local mergers and acquisitions,interim CEO will make fewer mergers and acquisitions in different places,and the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions are less in different places.Furthermore,interim CEOs who receive salaries in listed companies and ones who are appointed internally are more inclined to reduce the frequency of merger and acquisitions and the efficiency of merger and acquisition is high.If both parties of merger and acquisitions are not all state-owned enterprises,the frequency of mergers and acquisitions is relatively lower but the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions is higher by interim CEO.