融资约束下高管激励机制与中小企业研发投资行为——基于货币薪酬、股权激励的对比视角

The Impact of Executive Incentives on R&D Investment of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises under Financing Constraints:A Comparative Perspective of Monetary Incentive and Equity Incentive

以2011—2019年中小板上市公司为样本,实证检验融资约束差异化情景下高管激励机制对企业研发投资的影响机理与效应。研究发现,随着外部融资环境的趋紧,单一高管激励机制对中小企业研发投资呈现反向效应,货币薪酬的激励效应逐渐减弱,股权激励的抑制效应不断增强;在高融资约束下,单一股权激励抑制效应显著高于货币薪酬激励效应,组合激励机制却呈现更显著的激励效应。基于此,面对融资约束的中小企业应优化设计高管激励机制、强化制度短板的绩效考核、营造积极的实业投资和研发创新氛围,聚力内涵式发展。

The specific impact and contrast effect of executive incentive mechanism on R&D investment under different financial constraints are empirically tested by using small and medium-sized board listed companies data from 2011 to 2019.It is found that the single executive incentive system has a reverse effect on the R&D investment of SMEs,the incentive effect of monetary compensation is gradually weakened,and the inhibitory effect of equity incentive is increasing with the tightening of external financing environment.Especially under high financing constraints,the inhibition effect of single equity incentive is significantly higher than that of monetary compensation incentive,but the combined incentive mechanism is significantly stimulated excitation effect.Based on this,facing the financing constraints,small and medium-sized enterprises should strengthen the performance appraisal of institutional weaknesses to optimize the design of executive incentive system,and focus on connotative development by industrial investment and R&D innovation.