地方政府债务、腐败与经济增长

Local Government Debt,Corruption and Economic Growth

在分析地方政府债务、腐败与经济增长关系的基础上,利用2012—2017年我国省级面板数据,将三者纳入同一分析框架内,构建静态面板模型和动态面板模型进行实证分析。结果表明:在保持控制变量不变的条件下,地方政府债务规模继续扩大会抑制经济增长,腐败对经济增长的直接影响并不显著,但腐败可以通过作用于地方政府债务间接对经济增长产生消极影响,稳健性检验表明上述结果具有较强的可靠性。进一步地分区域对三者关系分别进行检验,发现回归结果仍然具有稳健性,说明腐败作用于地方政府债务影响经济增长的机制存在区域异质性。因此,严格控制地方政府债务规模,加大腐败查处力度,分区域制定债务管理办法更益于经济增长。

While analyzing the relationship among the local government debt,corruption and economic growth,this paper brings them into the same framework to build the static and dynamic panel data models by using China’s provincial panel data from 2012 to 2017.As this empirical study shows,given that the control variables remain unchanged,the increasing expansion of local government debt will significantly inhibit economic growth,and the direct impact of corruption on economic growth is not significant,but corruption may negatively affect economic growth in an indirect way through its impact on the local government debt.A robustness check further confirms that these conclusions are of more reliability.Furthermore,a respective test of the interaction of these three aspects conducted for the different regions indicate that the regression result is also robust,which shows that a regional heterogeneity exists in the way that corruption increases economic growth by affecting the local government debt.Therefore,it is suggested to strictly control the scale of local government debt,intensify the fight against corruption,and formulate the debt management measures by the region,which are more conducive to economic growth.