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考虑主体心理行为的一对多双边匹配决策方法 被引量:2

Decision Analysis Method for One-to-Many Two-Sided Matching Considering Psychological Behavior of Agents
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摘要 一对多双边匹配问题在现实中存在着广泛的实际背景,如何在同时考虑双方的主体的满意程度以及中介利益的前提下,获取合适的一对多双边匹配决策结果是一个有价值的研究问题.文中针对具有偏好序值信息的一对多双边匹配问题,给出了一种新的双边匹配决策方法.首先给出了一对多双边匹配的概念以及A边、B边和双边完全匹配的概念,并给出了具有偏好序值信息的一对多双边匹配问题描述;其次,为获得匹配结果,依据行为决策理论中的前景理论计算出主体间的前景值,并在此基础上以每边主体前景值之和最大为目标构建双目标优化模型,通过模型求解获得最优的A边(或B边)完全匹配结果.最后,通过一个IT软件外包双边匹配的例子说明了提出方法的可用性. One-to-many two-sided matching problem has a wide practical background in reality.On the premise of ensuring the satisfaction degrees of agents on both sides and the interests of intermediary,how to propose an appropriate oneto-many matching decision method is worth studying.A new decision method is proposed to solve the one-to-many two-sided matching problem with the preference ordinal number information.Firstly,the concepts of one-to-many two-sided matching and complete matching on side A side B and both sides are introduced.Then,the description of one-to-many two-sided matching problem with preference ordinal number information is given.Furthermore,to obtain the matching result,the prospect values between agents are calculated based on prospect theory of behavioral decision theory.And on this basis,for maximizing the sum of prospect value of agents on each side,a two-objective optimization model is constructed.The optimal complete matching result on side A(or side B)can be obtained by solving the model.Finally,an example is given to illustrate the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed method.
作者 肖汉强 赵扬 XIAO Hanqiang;ZHAO Yang(Department of Public Order,Criminal Investigation Police University of China,Shenyang 110035;School of Economics and Management,Shenyang Institute of Engineering,Shenyang 110136)
出处 《系统科学与数学》 CSCD 北大核心 2020年第11期2071-2081,共11页 Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金 国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFC0807500) 国家自然科学基金项目(71974067) 辽宁省重点科技研发计划项目(2017231005) 辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L18AGL003) 沈阳市重点科技研发计划(17-192-9-00)资助课题。
关键词 一对多双边匹配 偏好序值 前景理论 优化模型 One-to-many two-sided matching preference ordinal number prospect theory optimization model
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