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考虑回收品质量可控的再制造闭环供应链决策 被引量:4

A Research on Decision-making of Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain with Controllable Quality of Recycled Products
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摘要 研究回收品质量可控背景下的再制造闭环供应链决策问题。考虑质量投入与奖励函数2种控制变量对再制造过程中回收品质量的影响,构建集中决策与分散决策下制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,采用逆向求解法求解2种决策条件下的模型最优解,并利用数值模拟分析回收品质量对各参数的影响。研究表明,相较于分散决策,联合决策具有更高的经济性收益性与风险敏感性;不论是分散决策或是联合决策,回收价、供应链企业利润等都与回收品质量呈正相关;消费者强烈的绿色偏好与回收价格偏好能够对供应链利润产生积极影响。 The decision-making of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under controllable quality of recycled products is studied.Based on a remanufactured closed-loop supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single seller,quality functions and reward functions are introduced.Based on this,a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model under centralized and decentralized decisions is built.The optimal solution of the model under decision-making conditions,and the effects of the recovered quality on various parameters are analyzed using numerical simulation.Research shows that compared with decentralized decision-making,joint decision-making has higher economic returns and risk sensitivity.Whether it is decentralized decision or joint decision-making,the recovery price and supply chain company profits are positively related to the quality of recovery,and the"market promotion"effect is formed.Consumers’strong green preferences and recycling price preferences can have a positive impact on supply chain profits.
作者 路正南 杨鹏 LU Zhengnan;YANG Peng(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处 《工业工程》 北大核心 2021年第1期27-34,共8页 Industrial Engineering Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71673120) 教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(16YJA630035)。
关键词 回收品质量 再制造闭环供应链 质量投入 博弈模型 recycling quality remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain quality investment game model
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