不同主导权结构下的双渠道供应链定价策略及协调机制研究

Pricing Strategy and Coordination Mechanism of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Dominant Structures

基于制造商开辟线上直销渠道与线下零售渠道构成双渠道供应链的背景下,结合实际的服务影响因素,对不同主导权结构下双渠道供应链各成员的定价策略和协调机制进行研究。分别构建制造商主导、零售商主导、垂直均衡三种分散决策下的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,研究发现相较于集中决策,分散决策下供应链成员在价格、需求、利润上均有所损失。为缓解渠道之间的矛盾与冲突,引入一种双向收益共享契约用于协调供应链。研究表明,在一定的收益共享范围内,双向收益共享契约可以完美协调供应链;对于主导企业而言,主导权越向自身集中,所需共享的收益比例也越小;随着零售商服务水平的增大,制造商的利润不断增大,零售商的利润不断减小,供应链整体利润呈先增后减趋势。

Based on the background of the dual-channel supply chain composed of online direct sales channel and offline retail channel,combined with the actual service influencing factor,we study the pricing strategies and coordination mechanisms under different dominant structures.We constructs two-stage Stackelberg game model under three decentralized decision-making modes:Manufacturer leading,retailer leading and Nash equilibrium respectively.Compared with centralized,supply chain members lose in price,demand and profit under decentralized.In order to alleviate the conflict between channels,a two-way revenue sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the supply chain.The research shows that in a certain range of revenue sharing,the two-way revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the supply chain.For leading enterprise,the more centralized the dominant power is,the smaller the proportion of revenue it needs to shar.With the increase of service level of retailer,the profit of manufacturer is increasing,the profit of retailer is decreasing,and the overall profit of supply chain is increasing first and then decreasing.