上市企业政府补贴决定中的博弈效应估算研究

A Study on the Estimation of Game Effect in the Government Subsidy Decision for Listed Companies

政府补贴决定问题是学界长期关注的热点问题,补贴规模和强度不仅受政府和企业个体特征因素的影响,还受政府和企业间博弈行为的影响。采用双边随机边界模型,使用2007—2018年沪深两市A股上市企业样本数据,实证研究了政府和企业间博弈行为对补贴决定的影响,研究结果表明:政府和企业间博弈行为对补贴决定具有重要影响;平均水平上,政府剩余显著高于企业剩余,即综合博弈效应表现为政府方获得净剩余,政府和企业最终达成的补贴水平因此被压低;博弈行为对补贴决定的影响于政企双方个体特征维度上呈现出显著异质性。

Government subsidy is a key issue of academic concern.The scale and intensity of subsidies are affected not only by the individual characteristics of the government and enterprises,but also by the game behavior between the government and enterprises.Using the two-sided stochastic boundary model and the sample data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018,this paper empirically studies the influence of game behavior between government and enterprise on government subsidies.The results show that the game behavior between the government and enterprises has an important impact on the subsidy decision.On average,the government surplus is significantly higher than the enterprise surplus,that is to say,the comprehensive game effect shows that the government obtains the net surplus,and the subsidy level finally reached by the government and enterprises is depressed.The influence of game behavior on subsidy decision shows significant heterogeneity in the dimension of individual characteristics of both government and enterprise.