摘要
由于对核电厂执行A类安全功能的软件要求极高,必须遵守核质保体系的开发要求,如HAF 003和IEC 60880等,市场上这类软件较少。对此,核电用户将目光转向基于工业标准IEC 61508-3开发的软件。这些软件有着良好的应用经验,但是其开发和鉴定过程并不严格依据核电领域的相关标准。因此,这类工业级软件是否有足够高的可信度应用于核电领域,是一个值得考虑的问题。针对这一现状,对IEC 61508-3与IEC 60880进行了深入研究并执行了对比分析,确定了IEC 61508-3标准中不能充分覆盖IEC 60880的要求,明确了基于IEC 61508-3标准开发的软件,还需要考虑哪些方面的要求才能达到执行A类安全功能的软件质量。该研究结果为核电厂对工业级软件的选择和适用性分析提供理论依据,进一步推动了商用软件产品在核电安全重要仪控系统的应用。
Due to the extremely high requirements for the software that performs category A safety functions in nuclear power plants,it is necessary to comply with the development requirements of nuclear quality assurance systems,such as the requirements of HAF 003 and IEC 60880.There are few such software on the market,so nuclear power users turn their attention to the software developed based on the industrial standard IEC 61508-3,which has good application experience,but its development and identification process is not strictly based on the relevant standards in the field of nuclear power,whether such industrial-grade software has high enough credibility to apply the field of nuclear power is a question worth considering.In view of this situation,through in-depth research and comparative analysis of IEC 61508-3 and IEC 60880,the requirements of IEC 61508-3 that cannot fully cover IEC 60880 were determined,and the additional requirements for software based on the IEC 61508-3 standard in order to achieve the quality of software performing Class A safety functions was specified.The research results provide a theoretical basis for the selection and applicability analysis of industrial-grade software in nuclear power plants,and further promote the application of commercial software products in nuclear power safety important instrument control systems.
作者
王少华
冯素梅
陈日罡
张志良
WANG Shaohua;FENG Sumei;CHEN Rigang;ZHANG Zhiliang(China Nuclear Power Engineering Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 100840,China)
出处
《自动化仪表》
CAS
2021年第2期68-72,83,共6页
Process Automation Instrumentation
关键词
执行A类安全功能的软件
安全完整性等级
预开发软件
软件修改
软件工具
共因失效
面向应用的语言
自监督
Software that performs category A safety functions
Safety integrity level
Pre-developed software
Software modification
Software tools
Common cause failure
Application-oriented language
Self-supervision