基层官员的背锅风险由何而来--聚焦于基层特种设备安全监管的研究

Why the Street—Level Bureaucrats Have to Bear the Risk of"Beiguo"--Empirical Research on the Street-Level Enforcement of Special Equipm ent Safety Regulation

有关领域的基层官员承受着背锅风险。对此可综合制度因素与基层环境因素构建解释:其中前者涉及绩效合法性逻辑和分权化执行结构,后者则强调基层官员所面对的资源紧张和不确定性。这个解释认为:一方面,在关键治理议题上的绩效承诺与治理实践中难免的表现不佳存在着难以消除的矛盾;这个矛盾经具有避责功能的分权化执行结构传递和放大,形成了有关领域基层官员无法规避的责难。另一方面,资源紧张和不确定性决定了基层官员须大量地自由裁量;由于自由裁量实则在规则模糊地带行事,基层官员难以对之做出充分的解释和正当化,从而为以至少在形式上合理合法的方式向其转移责难创造了条件。聚焦于基层特种设备安全监管的案例分析为以上观点提供了经验阐释。基层官员承受的背锅风险是避责现象的后果之一,以上理论和经验研究阐明了这种后果的形成机制,在一定程度上发展了既有避责研究。

The objective of this paper is to explore the risk of "beiguo"(being left holding the bag)borne by street-level bureaucrats theoretically and empirically. A case study using data from field works on the streetlevel regulatory enforcement of special equipment safety in Y province was conducted. Analysis considering both the inherent institutional dynamics and the effects of street-level context revealed that, the contradiction between the promises on the performance related to some critical governance issues and the inevitable governance failures in practice, being transferred and amplified through the decentralized implementing structure which can be used to shift blame, become the blame that street-level bureaucrats have to take. Besides, the discretion that is necessary to perform duties in the street-level contexts characterized by resource inadequacy and uncertainty also facilitate the blame shifting to street-level bureaucrats. Therefore, the street-level bureaucrats in areas corresponding to these issues cannot escape from the risk of beiguo. The key limitation of this paper is that the comparative analysis taking account of the differences across the governance areas and regions cannot be achieved through a single case study and therefore, the more general explanations and findings cannot be provided. Advancing the extant research on blame avoidance that primarily focused on the decentralized implementing structure by incorporating understanding of the governance logic of performance legitimacy. More important, improving the understanding of the "micro-/meso foundation" of blame avoidance by highlighting the effects of the street-level context and then exploring the mechanism for an immediate consequence of blame avoidance, i.e. the risk of beiguo borne by street-level bureaucrats.