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论知善行恶

On Knowing the Better and Doing the Worse
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摘要 应当和促动之间的关系,有外在主义和内在主义之分。大致来讲,外在主义主张,一个人知道方式A比B好(即知道应当做行动A)但未必有动机支持做行动A。而内在主义主张,一个人知道应当做行动A就是有一个确凿理由支持做行动A。彻底的或极端的内在主义混淆了“有一个确凿理由”的两种意义,即混淆了“有一个确凿的好理由”和“有一个确凿的有力理由”(或“有一个必然的现行理由”)。这种混淆导致了极端内在主义者认为,一个人知道应当做行动A就必然会做行动A而非行动B,从而没有知善却蓄意行恶的事情。相比之下,有一种内在主义没有这种混淆,它主张“知道应当做什么”未必是“有一个确凿的有力理由”,从而并非出于冲动的知善行恶是可能的。 A distinction can be drawn between externalism and internalism in the case of the relation between ought and motivation.Roughly,externalism is the view that a person knows course A is better than B,i.e.he ought to do action A,and yet does not necessarily have a motive for doing A.And internalism argues that to know he ought to do A is to have a conclusive reason for doing A.Radical or extreme internalism confuses two senses of“having a conclusive reason”,namely“having a conclusively good reason”and“having a conclusively powerful reason”(or“having a necessarily prevailing reason”).The confusion leads the extreme internalist to think that a person who knows he ought to do A will necessarily do A rather than B,and,hence,that there is no such a thing as knowing the better yet deliberately doing the worse.By contrast,there is a form of internalism which,without the confusion,argues that to know what ought to do would not necessarily be to have a conclusively powerful reason,and concludes that it is possible to know the better and do the worse not from impulse.
作者 威尔弗里德·塞拉斯 王玮(译) 朱世静(译) Wilfrid Sellars(Department of Philosophy,University of Pittsburgh)
出处 《当代中国价值观研究》 2020年第2期117-128,共12页 Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values
基金 国家社科基金后期资助项目“塞拉斯及其哲学研究”(20FZXB003)的阶段性成果。
关键词 应当 理由 知识 美德 good ought reason knowledge virtue

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