晋升激励、薪酬管制与投资效率

Promotion Incentive, Salary Control and Investment Efficiency

国有企业高管薪酬管制是我国政府促进社会公平、缩小收入差距的重要制度,但目前政策的干预效果尚未达成明确统一的结论。文章以2009年发布的国企“限薪令”为外生变量,运用双重差分法(DID)进行准自然实验,实证检验了薪酬管制政策对投资效率的影响。研究发现,薪酬管制的实施抑制了企业的过度投资现象,对投资不足的影响效果则不明显;在加入晋升激励作为调节变量之后,会强化薪酬管制对过度投资的抑制作用,对投资不足的影响没有显著变化;进一步研究发现,行业竞争度高时,薪酬管制对过度投资的抑制作用比行业竞争度低时更加明显,对投资不足的作用没有显著变化。本文得出的结论可以为薪酬管制积极的政策实施效果提供直接证据,具有重要现实意义,同时对新一轮的国企制度改革具有一定的参考价值。

This paper takes the state-owned enterprises"salary limit order"issued in 2009 as an exogenous variable,and,using the Double Difference Method(did),conducts a quasi natural experiment to empirically test the impact of salary control policies on investment efficiency.It found that the implementation of the policy restrained over investment,but the effect on under-investment is not obvious;after the promotion incentive is introduced as a regulating variable,the inhibition of compensation regulation is strengthened on over-investment,and no significant change is found in under-investment;The conclusion of this paper can be referential and instructive for the implementation of salary control policy,and for the new round of state-owned enterprise system reform.