客户参与产品服务系统开发的激励博弈分析

Incentive Game Analysis of Customer Participation in Product Service System Development

为了有效地促进客户参与产品服务系统开发,文中运用完全信息静态博弈理论,建立客户参与产品服务系统开发的激励博弈模型,通过对模型的均衡分析和算例验证,分析了博弈双方的策略选择过程,从而得出相应的研究结论和管理启示。研究表明:在纯策略情况下,博弈双方最优的策略选择为:(不激励,参与)策略;在混合策略情况下,制造企业与客户将会以一定的概率选择(激励,参与)策略;制造企业选择“激励”策略的概率与客户的参与成本正相关,与客户的收益增量、客户缴纳的罚金负相关;客户选择“参与”策略的概率与其缴纳的罚金正相关,与制造企业的激励成本和损失负相关。

In order to effectively promote the customer to participate in product service system development,the incentive game model of customer participation in product service system development is established by the complete information static game theory.Through the equilibrium analysis and example verification of the model,the process of strategy choices of both sides of the game is analyzed.Therefore,the corresponding research conclusions and management enlightenments are obtained.The study shows:in the case of pure strategy,the optimal strategy choice for both sides of the game is the strategy of(no incentive,participation),in the case of mixed strategy,the manufacturing enterprise and customer will choose the strategy of(incentive,participation)with a certain probability.The probability that the manufacturing enterprise chooses the“incentive”strategy is positively related to the customer s participation cost,and negatively related to the customer s incremental revenue,the penalties paid by the customer;the probability that the customer chooses the“participation”strategy is positively related to the penalties paid by the customer,and negatively related to the the manufacturing enterprise s incentive cost and losses.