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央行窗口指导效应评估分析——基于《中国货币政策执行报告》的经验研究

Evaluation Analysis of the Guidance Effect of the Central Bank Window——Based on the Empirical Study of“China Monetary Policy Implementation Report”
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摘要 《中国货币政策执行报告》作为人民银行的政策沟通渠道之一,按季定期公布,且报告结构体例大体一致。由于央行和公众之间存在信息不对称,因此通过该报告可以构建与公众之间的桥梁,有助于公众理解央行的意图,人民银行可以更好地实现其政策效果。本文通过解构报告,提取人民银行发布的报告中对基本面及信贷、社融、流动性描述的关键语句,对其量化赋予分值,构建评分模型,梳理报告中话语体系的变化脉络,判断货币政策的松紧程度,推测人民银行通过书面文件所要传达的政策信号,方便公众理解政策。 As one of the policy communication channels of the People's Bank of China,the“China Monetary Policy Implementation Report”will be published on a quarterly basis and the following month of the next quarter.The structure of each quarterly report is roughly the same,and the difference is mainly reflected in the specific wording.Due to the information asymmetry between the central bank and the public,the report can build a bridge with the public,help the public understand the central bank's intentions,and the People's Bank of China can better achieve policy effects.By deconstructing the report,this article extracts the key statements describing fundamentals and credit,social financing,and liquidity in the report issued by the People's Bank of China,assigns scores to them quantitatively,and builds a scoring model to sort out the context of changes in the discourse system in the report.Judge the degree of tightness of monetary policy and speculate on the policy signals that the People's Bank of China will convey through written documents to facilitate the public's understanding of the policy.
作者 程昊 丘锦波 CHENG Hao;QIU Jin-bo(Essence Securities Co.Ltd;China Merchants Bank)
出处 《当代金融研究》 2021年第1期56-69,共14页 Journal of Contemporary Financial Research
关键词 货币政策 话语体系 评分模型 Monetary Policy Discourse System Scoring Model
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