数字市场的竞争法实施——从欧盟近期判例法中汲取的经验

Competition Law Enforcement on Digital Markets——Lessons from Recent EU Case Law

本文并不认可欧盟法院(CJEU)就Pierre Fabre与Coty Germany Gmb案所作出的判决,认为在数字经济领域,价格不再是竞争的唯一重要参数,因此竞争法有必要重构其理论基础,以解释在集中市场设计中所蕴含的张力。正如欧盟法院在Pierre Fabre与Coty案中采取的做法所表明的,当竞争主管部门和法院在考虑市场监管的法律框架时,也需要考量到市场的独特心理属性。因此,本文解释欧盟法院的决定并非驳斥关于品牌间和品牌内竞争的著名争论,而是借鉴了在市场中创造不同类型的“多样性”概念,以便消费者不仅能够在他们面临替代选择时做出选择,而且还能够使之做出将影响他们思考是否应该考虑替代选择的决定。本文的研究成果旨在推进关于数字市场监管方式总体政策目标的讨论。

This article is set against the Court of Justice of the European Union’s(CJEU)decisions in Pierre Fabre and Coty Germany GmbH,observing that in the digital economy,price is no longer the sole important parameter of competition and that competition law therefore has to reconstruct the theoretical background required to explain the tensions contained in the design of concentrated marketplaces.As the CJEU’s approach taken in Pierre Fabre and Coty shows,competition authorities and courts also need to consider the market’s distinct psychological properties when they contemplate the legal framework that governs it.The article thus explains the CJEU’s decisions are not against the wellknown debate about inter-and intrabrand competition but with reference to the notion of creating distinct types of‘variety’in the marketplace so as to enable consumers to choose not only between the alternative options that they face but also to enable them to make decisions that will shape the manner in which they think about whether they should consider alternative options at all.The article’s fi ndings aim to advance debates about the overarching policy goals of the way in which digital markets ought to be regulated.