实报还是谎报——双边信息激励与供应链效率

Telling truth or lying:Bilateral information incentive and supply chain efficiency

探讨了双边不对称信息下供应链信息真实分享和谎报对效率的影响。首先,给出完全信息下的最优商品交易量和供应链利润作为比较基准。其次,构建双方信息真实分享的激励模型。研究发现激励双方信息真实共享所需的信息租金降低交易量和供应链利润。再次,构建允许信息谎报的交易量谈判模型。研究发现,供销双方都偏好高报自己的信息类型。个体谎报信息的幅度随着谈判力增加而减小。拥有绝对谈判力的一方不会谎报信息。供应链效率与谎报信息的幅度、成本上界以及销售价格相关。最后,通过数值算例对实报信息和谎报信息下交易量、供应链个体利润及效率进行对比分析。研究结果为管理实践提供一定的洞见:供应链企业是否激励双边信息分享可根据双方成本大小进行选择。

Information affects largely supply chain firms′decisions and supply chain efficiency.In a supply chain,truthfully reporting their(private)information between the upstream firm and the downstream firm enables better decisions but meanwhile,incurs information rent for revealing as well.Conversely,misreporting information reduces information rent but leads to double marginalization effect(of reporting information).Thus,the research questions are addressed as follows:How does information truthfully sharing or information misreporting affect both the efficiency and decision-making of a supply chain firm?Does sharing true information always generate a higher supply chain efficiency than misreporting information?How is it determined whether to encourage information sharing or to permit information misreporting?To answer the above-mentioned questions,a two-stage supply chain consisting of one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-neutral retailer is considered,who have private production cost and retail cost,respectively.Firstly,a newsvendor model under full information is constructed with the optimal trading quantity and the supply chain profit as benchmarks.Secondly,an information incentive model exchanging information truthfully is constructed.Under this case,only when the supplier′s information rent and the retailer′s information rent are satisfied can information truthfully sharing be achieved.It also reveals that information rents of both sides affect the trading quantity and supply chain profits.Compared with the full information case,the trading quantity and the supply chain profit are reduced.Thirdly,a bargaining model of the trading quantity that allows information misreporting is constructed.Under this case,after negotiating a trading quantity by reporting their private information,the supplier and the retailer divide profits according to their own bargaining power.It shows that the supplier and the retailer prefer to announce a higher information type during their negotiation.The individual′s information misreporting is decreasing as the bargaining power increases.The party that has all bargaining power would not misreport its information.Fourthly,the trading quantities and supply chain efficiency under two models are compared.It is showed that when the total misreporting range(of the supplier and the retailer)is lower than an upper bound,the trading quantity under information misreporting is higher than that under information sharing.The supply chain efficiency is defined from the perspective of the profits gained from the whole supply chain,and then the trading quantity,profits of the supplier,the retailer as well as the supply chain efficiency are compared.It shows that the supply chain efficiency is related to the information rents and retail price under the information sharing model,while under the trading quantity bargaining model,the supply chain efficiency is closely linked to the total range of information misreporting,the price as well as the upper bound of costs.Finally,the numerical example shows that for a fixed price,either under information truthful sharing or information misreporting,the trading quantity is decreasing with the costs growing.For a fixed cost,the higher retail price enables trading more easily when information sharing truthfully;the higher retail price increases higher extents of misreporting information when information misreporting.These results also show that if costs of the supplier and the retailer are lower(higher)than previously estimated,encouraging truthful information(permitting misreporting information)will create higher supply chain efficiency.The research conclusions provide some managerial insights for practical management:in an ODM(Original Design Manufacturing)supply chain,firms can decide whether to share truthful information or not according to the comparison between the actual costs and predicted ones.