二战前英法苏德的战略情报评估与决策

On Strategic Intelligence Estimation and Decision-making of Britain,France,Soviet Union and Germany before World War Ⅱ

20世纪30年代,法西斯德国迅速崛起。面对迫在眉睫的战争威胁,以英国、法国、苏联为代表的欧洲大国却迟迟不能实现协调和结盟,特别是英法等西方主要大国对法西斯德国长期推行绥靖政策,结果使希特勒的战争企图付诸实施,最终未能抑制二战爆发。立足于战略情报评估的视角,深入剖析二战前英法苏德战略情报评估与决策出现的问题,可以发现,英国、法国、苏联等主要大国对法西斯德国的战略情报评估失误与政治外交博弈失败,就是这一灾难性后果的集中体现。

Faced with the rapid rise of fascist Germany in 1930 s and the imminent threat of war, the European powers represented by Britain, France and the Soviet Union were unable to achieve coordination and alliance, and particularly the pacification policy the western powers including Britain and France stuck to over a long term eventually led to the outbreak of World War Ⅱ. From the perspective of strategic intelligence estimation, this paper analyzes the problems of strategic intelligence estimation and decision-making in Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Germany before World War Ⅱ and it shows that the false judgment made by Britain, France and the Soviet Union in estimating the fascist Germany’s strategic intelligence and the failure of political diplomacy are the causes of this disastrous outcome.