基于完全博弈的PPP模式下城市地下综合管廊项目风险分担比例研究

Risk sharing distribution proportion of the utility tunnel PPP project based on the integrated game theory

随着经济发展的不断推进,低速的市政基础设施建设成为制约城市发展的一大短板,地下综合管廊项目应运而生,而解决新旧管网的矛盾冲突和运营管理混乱等问题迫在眉睫,风险因素庞杂难控,亟待完善风险分担机制。针对PPP模式下的城市地下综合管廊项目,从社会资本方的角度,基于已识别的项目风险和风险偏好博弈模型,提出风险共担的分类方法,用于确定需要项目参与方共担的风险因素;基于讨价还价博弈,构建风险分担模型,求解出政府和社会资本方具体的风险分担比例;基于多方完全信息静态博弈,构建社会资本联合体内部模型,确定n个社会资本方各自的风险分担比例。在政府和社会资本方、社会资本方间进行两个阶段的风险分担博弈,以明确各方共担风险的比例,理论上有助于多方动态博弈模型的理论建设,实践上可提高城市综合管廊项目的运行效率。

The present paper is aimed at making a principal analysis of the components derived from a vast number of literature reviews,with the particular expertise assessment to give the final risk index system. As for the utility tunnel PPP projects,the given paper intends to apply the integrated game theory to specify the interior relationship between the governmental organs and the private ventures in front of the diversified project risks.And,to make the said object successful,the first step is to classify the different project risks in utility tunnel PPP projects.And,then,a game model has been established to determine whether the project risk should be taken up by the corresponding government organs and/or a private ventured company simultaneously on the basis of the risk preference. And,thus,in turn,the sharing risks have to be settled down by the respective project participants. And,next,it is necessary to ascertain the specific proportional shares of the risk-ventures among the public and private venture counterparts. At this stage,we have also built up a bargaining game model by taking the negotiation loss and the unequal status into account so as to illustrate properly the infinite alternation-offer bargaining game tree of the government official organs and the private ventures here mentioned. On the other hand,the negotiation loss tends to be defined as the time cost and the economic cost in the bargaining process,though the unequal status-in-situ can be used to define the risk degrees the government organs would like to transfer the said projects to the private ventures with. Besides,the private ventures usually form an association to join the utility tunnel PPP projects so as to reduce the project risks for themselves. That is to say,it’s of great importance to determine the risk-sharing ratio among such private ventures furthermore. And,thereafter,the game model can be brought about in view of the Nash game theory and to the entire information static game. To sum up,the final risk-sharing ratio can be ascertained based on the above mentioned process. In other words,according to the final risk index system of the utility tunnel PPP,the risk can be properly allocated in accordance with the first game model of the risk classification,with the Nash equilibrium being taken to work out the specific risk-sharing ratio of the risks to be shared up. And,in turn,the more a project participant is eager to take up the risks,the more likely for it to gain or take up the duty share and in turn suggest better benefits.Thus,it can be seen that the given research has to be of great help to build up a theoretical model of the multiple dynamic game and improve the operation efficiency of the utility tunnel of PPP projects.