供应链金融下商业银行与核心企业委托代理关系研究

Research on the Principal-agent Relationship between Commercial Banks and Core Enterprises under Supply Chain Finance

商业银行主导下的供应链金融要求银行依托供应链核心企业开展业务。商业银行要加强与核心企业的合作,实现共赢,从而推动供应链金融的发展,解决中小企业融资难问题。本文从商业银行与核心企业之间的委托代理关系角度入手,构建委托代理激励约束模型,引入线性激励机制,研究二者的成本和收益,探索商业银行主导下的供应链金融发展出现瓶颈的原因,并提出相应的解决思路。

The supply chain finance led by commercial banks requires banks to rely on the core enterprises of the supply chain to carry out business.Commercial banks should strengthen cooperation with core enterprises to achieve win-win results,so as to promote the development of supply chain finance and solve the long-term problem of financing difficulties for small and medium-sized enterprises.From the perspective of principal-agent relationship between commercial banks and core enterprises,this paper constructs a principal-agent incentive constraint model by introducing a linear incentive mechanism,to analyze and study the costs and benefits of both,trying to explore the causes of bottlenecks in the development of supply chain finance led by commercial banks,and put forward corresponding solutions.