农村基础设施PPP项目风险分担的博弈研究

Game Research on Risk Allocation in Rural Infrastructure Public-Private Partnership Project

引入静态博弈理论,建立基于多方共赢的农村基础设施PPP项目共担风险与单方承担风险分析模型,确定农村基础设施PPP项目初步风险分担方案;基于动态博弈理论,建立农村基础设施PPP项目共担风险最优分担比例决策模型,求得模型的最优纳什均衡解,确定共担风险最优分担比例。结果表明:农村基础设施PPP项目风险分担的静态博弈中,参与主体的风险偏好与风险控制能力决定了风险的初步分担方案;而在私营方优先出价的农村基础设施PPP项目共担风险分担的动态博弈中,谈判损耗系数的大小、双方地位不平等及信息不对称的程度直接影响共担风险最优分担比例的大小。

The static game theory is introduced to establish risk-sharing and unilateral risk analysis model based on multi-party win-win rural infrastructure PPP project,thus the initial risk sharing plan for rural infrastructure PPP projects is determined.Based on dynamic game theory,a decision-making model for rural infrastructure PPP projects’optimal risk sharing ratio is established to find the optimal Nash equilibrium solution of the model and determine the optimal risk sharing ratio.The research shows that in the static game of risk sharing in rural infrastructure PPP projects,the risk appetite and risk control capabilities of the participants determine the initial risk sharing plan;while in the dynamic game of risk sharing of rural infrastructure PPP projects with priority bids by the private party,the size of the negotiation loss coefficient of the public and private parties,the unequal status of the two parties and the degree of information asymmetry directly affect the size of the optimal risk sharing ratio.