一个关于跨界污染控制的清洁技术创新微分博弈模型

A Differential Game Model on Clean Technology Innovation for Transboundary Pollution Control

把清洁技术水平视为内生变量,构建了一个跨界污染的两国关于清洁技术创新微分博弈模型。在该模型中,参与国可以通过清洁技术投资或者等待对方创新投资的溢出来提高清洁技术水平,且两国均有两个可以选择的战略,即合作战略和非合作战略。研究的结果显示,技术外溢强度对参与国的技术投资和技术水平均有负向影响,相比不合作,跨界污染控制合作使各国以更低的代价获得更清洁的技术和更高的社会福利。

Taking clean technology levels as an endogenous variable,this paper investigates a differentia game between two symmetric countries for clean technology innovation with technology overflow.In this model,participating countries can improve the quality of clean technology in two ways——investing in clean technology themselves or waiting for the spillover of innovation investment from each other.Strategic space the two countries can choose includes non-cooperative and cooperative strategies.The results demonstrate that the intensity of technology spillover has a negative impact on participating countries’technology investment and technology level.Compared with non-cooperation,the cooperation of transboundary pollution control enables countries to obtain cleaner technologies and higher social welfare at a lower cost.