论豪森对无奇迹论证的反驳与推进

On Howson’s Refutation and Advancement of No-Miracle Argument

作为实在论辩护的核心策略之一,无奇迹论证试图从科学的经验性成功推论其"近似真理性",并以"无奇迹"作为置信度指标。豪森分析了无奇迹论证的基本逻辑,批评了其在"近似真理"概念上的问题与逻辑困境,并通过揭示论证过程中的基础概率谬误否定了其逻辑有效性。随后,通过引入主观概率解释以及"休谟不等式",豪森提出了一个逻辑上有效的无奇迹论证形式。在贝叶斯主义的框架下,该论证保证了一定的客观性,且与实在论辩护的"局域化"策略殊途同归,从而为实在论提供了较为合理的辩护。

As one of the core strategies of defending for realism,No-Miracle Argument attempts to reason form a scientific theory’s empirical success to its "approximate truth",with "no miracle" being the confidence level.Howson analyzes the basic logic of No-Miracle Argument and denies its logical soundness by revealing the logical problems of "approximate truth" and Base-Rate Fallacy it commits in the inference.Subsequently,he introduces subjective probability and "Hume’s Inequality",which begets a logically sound No-Miracle Argument.Under the framework of Bayesianism,this argument provides a sound defense for realism which guarantees objectivity in certain sense and arrives at the same point with "localizing" strategy through a different way.