财政分权、地方政府竞争与地区全要素生产率

Fiscal Decentralization,Local Government Competition and Regional Total Factor Productivity

全要素生产率是衡量经济高质量发展的重要指标。基于地方政府竞争视角,分析财政分权对地区全要素生产率的影响机制并提出假设,采用DEA-Malmquist生产率指数法对我国省级层面2001—2018年的地区全要素生产率指数进行测算与分解,进一步构建固定效应模型进行实证分析,得出如下结论财政分权抑制地区全要素生产率的提高,地方政府竞争与财政分权存在交互关系,地方政府竞争弱化了财政分权对全要素生产率的抑制作用;从全要素生产率的分解来看,财政分权主要是通过对技术效率的抑制作用阻碍全要素生产率的提高;分区域来看,中西部财政分权和地方政府竞争的良性互动,相较于东部更有利于全要素生产率的提高。

Total factor productivity is an important index for measuring the high-quality development of economy.Based on the perspective of local government competition,this paper theoretically analyzes the impact mechanism of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on total factor productivity and puts forward hypothesis by using the DEA-Malmquist index to measure the total factor productivity,and constructing the fixed effect model with empirical analysis based on 30 provincial panel data of China from 2001 to 2018.The results are as follows.First,fiscal decentralization significantly decreased the regional total factor productivity,and there is interaction between fiscal decentralization and local government competition.Local government competition weakens the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on total factor productivity.Second,in terms of the decomposition of total factor productivity,fiscal decentralization mainly hinders the improvement of total factor productivity by inhibiting technical efficiency.Thirdly,from a regional perspective,compared with the east,the central and western regions have better fiscal decentralization and positive interaction with local government competition,which is more conductive to the improvement of total factor productivity.