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数字平台智能算法的反竞争效应研究 被引量:20

The Anti-competition Effect of Intelligent Algorithm of Digital Platforms
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摘要 智能算法具有促进竞争和妨害竞争的双重属性,既能够提高交易效率,也能因算法合谋、自身非中立导致搜索排序非中立、智能定价导致价格歧视等妨害竞争。并且算法合谋的定价更可能反映了真实的价格,搜索排序非中立和智能定价也是智能算法相较传统算法的创新。因此,界定智能算法创新和反竞争行为的边界,是全球反垄断机构所亟须面对的难题。算法合谋可分为主动合谋和被动合谋,主动合谋是本身违法原则所严格禁止的,被动合谋则需要根据合理性原则审慎处理。搜索排序非中立和价格歧视则需要结合智能算法的应用主体是否具有市场势力并造成实质性损害来判断。 Intelligent algorithm is an important part of digital platform.It was born to serve buyers and sellers,reduce transaction costs and improve transaction efficiency,but it can also hinder competition because of algorithm collusion,non-neutrality of search ranking,price discrimination by intelligent pricing and so on.However,the price by algorithm collusion may reflect the real price.Non-neutrality of search ranking and intelligent pricing are also innovations of intelligent algorithm compared with traditional algorithm.It is an urgent problem for global antitrust agencies to define the boundary between the innovation and anti-competitive behavior.Algorithm collusion can be divided into active collusion and passive collusion,and active collusion is strictly prohibited by per se illegality.However,passive collusion needs to be handled prudently according to the principle of rationality.The others need to be judged by whether the digital platform has the market power and has caused the substantial damage.
作者 戚聿东 蔡呈伟 张兴刚 Qi Yudong;Cai Chengwei;Zhang Xinggang(Business School,Beijing Normal University,Beijing 100875,P.R.China;College of Business Administration,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100700,P.R.China)
出处 《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第2期76-86,共11页 Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金 国家社科基金重大项目“技术标准与知识产权协同推进数字产业创新的机理与路径研究”(19ZDA077)。
关键词 数字平台 算法合谋 滥用市场支配地位 价格歧视 反竞争 Digital platforms Algorithmic collusion Abuse of market dominance Price discrimination Anti-competition
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