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虚构谈论的关涉性

Aboutness of Fictional Discourse
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摘要 虽然虚构角色不存在,但虚构谈论确是关于虚构角色的。为了使这一关涉可能,克兰提出了一种表征主义解释,但这一解释会受到强版本和弱版本两类反驳。这些反驳表明关涉性既具有表征性特征,也具有关系性特征。针对虚构谈论的关涉性,新的替代性策略将立足于表征之间的关系、而非表征的内在特征,从而虚构谈论关涉到的是相互关联的表征所共同聚焦的对象。新策略同时满足了表征性特征和关系性特征,因而避免了针对克兰解释的反驳。最后,一种内置遵从性用法的因果链条被用来解释表征之间的关系,补足了新策略的最后一环。 Although fictional characters do not exist, the fictional discourses are somehow about them. To make this kind of aboutness possible, Crane has provided a representationalist account. However, this account could be refuted both in its strong and weak versions, which indicates that aboutness has both the relational and representational features. With respect to the aboutness of fictional discourse, a new alternative strategy will be built upon the relation between representations rather than the intrinsic features of one single representation. Accordingly, what a fictional discourse is about is the common focus object of inter-related representations. The new strategy satisfies both the relational and representational features, thus immune from the objections against Crane’s account. Finally, some kind of causal chain involving deferential uses is used to elucidate the relation between representations, thereby complementing the last part of the new strategy.
作者 邵世恒 SHAO Shi-heng(School of Philosophy,Northwest University,Xi’an 710127,China)
出处 《自然辩证法研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第1期122-128,共7页 Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词 关涉性 表征主义 意向对象 聚焦对象 aboutness representationalism intentional object focus object
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