颜色的朴素实在论与克里普克的模态论证

A Naive Realist Theory of Color and Kripke’s Modal Argument

颜色的朴素实在论近年来又开始复苏。基斯·艾伦提出了关于颜色的独特性命题作为其朴素实在论的本质性组成部分;艾伦运用了克里普克风格的模态论证来证明这个独特性命题。本文构造了两个思想实验,即"某病毒红色"思想实验以及"流浪地球红色"思想实验,并运用这两个思想实验检验艾伦的模态论证。本文争辩说艾伦的这个论证并没有被完成,因为一些深层的语义困难和模态困难都还没有得到关注和解决。

The naive realist theory of color has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the recent years. Keith Allen proposes a distinctness thesis of color as a constitutive component of his version of the naive theory;Allen uses a Kripkean style modal argument to support the distinctness thesis. This paper constructs two thought experiments, namely, the "A virus red" thought experiment and the "wandering Earth red" thought experiment, to critically examine Allen’s modal argument. It argues that Allen’s modal argument is incomplete, because there are deep semantic and modal difficulties still not addressed.