康德先验主体的功能主义解释

Functionalist Interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Subject

在《纯粹理性批判》中康德指出,我们并不能够直接认识到心灵的内在结构,但我们可以根据心灵和经验间的关系来说明心灵所具有的功能性作用。一些学者进而认为,康德的这种心灵理论能够在当代功能主义的框架中被解释。然而,这种解释路径却面对着一个显著的困难:康德关于认知主体的先验理论何以能够被经验性地处理?对于该问题的解决需要构建一种关于康德先验主体的新形而上学,即将各种认知能力归属于一个先验的认知主体,进而在机器功能主义的框架内对其进行解释。

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant noted that we cannot know the mind directly, but we can account for the functional roles of the mind by appealing to the relationships between the mind and experience. This kind of view is therefore regarded as a sort of contemporary functionalism by some scholars. However, this method of interpretation has to face a notable difficult: how can Kant’s transcendental theory be dealt empirically? This issue could be solved in a kind of new metaphysical interpretation of Kant’s transcendental subject, namely, ascribing all the cognitive capacities to a transcendental subject, thus it would be explicated in the frame of machine functionalism.