银行高管薪酬延付政策能抑制影子银行扩张吗?

Does the Policy of Deferred Compensation for Bank Executives Restrain the Expansion of Shadow Banking?

银行延付高管薪酬是国际金融稳定委员会致力于风险防范的一项重大薪酬激励改革,本文拟探讨此项改革是否有助于遏制影子银行的扩张。以2007~2018年间我国商业银行为研究对象,结果发现:延付薪酬的实施产生了事与愿违的后果,潜藏巨大风险的影子银行非但没有受到限制,反而愈发增长。延付薪酬以后,虽然表内来看银行减少了高风险的房地产贷款,从而使得基于表内信息的风险评价指标得到改善,却通过影子银行的方式将此部分高风险贷款转移至表外以规避监管。进一步从延付薪酬的外部治理视角研究发现,银行上市以及外部审计有助于削弱延付薪酬对影子银行的影响。本文有效拓展了债权激励的研究边界,并为银行等金融机构风险管理的内部治理机制提供了借鉴。

After the 2008 financial crisis,shadow banking has attracted great attention from financial regulators all around the world.As a credit intermediary system beyond the formal system,shadow banking alleviates financial supervision and cause high systemic risks.Therefore,shadow banking governance has become the top priority of China to maintain financial stability.Based on the background of deferred compensation in China’s commercial banking industry,this paper explores whether the implementation of deferred compensation can guide commercial banks to reduce the scale of high-risk shadow banking business.On the one hand,according to agency theory,deferred compensation is different from other compensation arrangements.It not only coordinates the conflict of interest between shareholders and agents,but also allows bank executives to assume the role of creditor through deferred compensation arrangements.It also helps to alleviate the agency problem between bank executives and creditors,reduce the risk-taking motives of bank executives,thus reduces the shadow banking business that hides huge risks.On the other hand,although the risk monitoring indicators specified in the Guidelines can effectively monitor the risks of traditional credit business,it is difficult to determine the risks of shadow banking.According to the theory of regulatory arbitrage,this provides banks opportunity for regulatory arbitrage from less regulated shadow banking.Using the sample of Chinese banks from 2007 to 2018 and the promulgation of the Guidelines in 2010 as a"quasi-natural experiment",this paper explores the causal relationship between deferred compensation and the scale of shadow banking in commercial banks.The results of the paper show that:(1)The scale of shadow banking has increased significantly after the implementation of the deferred compensation.The deferred compensation has a counterproductive consequence.The deferred compensation arrangement has not restricted the high-risk shadow banking business,but promoted its growth.This conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests.(2)After the implementation of the deferred compensation,the banks seem to actively reduce loans to high-risk industries(such as real estate),and improve the on-balance sheet risk evaluation indicators,but in fact,the high-risk loan business was transferred to off-balance sheet shadow banks to avoid supervision and risk assessment.The contributions of this paper follow as:First,this paper not only theoretically enriches the research on debt incentives,but also provides evidence for the supervisors to deepen and improve their understanding of deferred compensation policies.Since Jensen and Meckling(1976)put forward the agency theory,debt incentives have been regarded as a weapon to safeguard the interests of creditors and reduce management risk.The subsequent theoretical and empirical studies have also mostly confirmed the positive role of deferred compensation payment in corporate risk prevention.However,this paper finds that the deferred compensation may have a negative effect.Secondly,this paper enriches the bank’s risk management and shadow banking supervision research from the perspective of executive compensation.After the financial crisis,shadow banking supervision has become the focus of the supervision of financial institutions in various countries and one of the focus topics of academic research.The evidence in this paper shows that under China’s financial system,the debt incentive reform of deferred compensation has a certain risk suppression effect,but it is not an effective mechanism to curb the shadow banking problem.