基于政府奖惩的闭环供应链决策研究

Research on Closed-loop Supply Chain under Reward-penalty Mechanism

文章基于委托-代理和博弈理论,在非对称信息情形下,构建了有无政府奖惩机制的闭环供应链博弈模型,通过分析最优决策发现:相较于碳排放奖惩,回收率奖惩能有效引导系统回收并降低产品零售价,奖惩力度越大则效果越明显;参与废旧产品回收有利于提高零售商收益,且高固定回收成本类型的零售商具有明显的规模优势,回收率奖惩力度越大则规模优势越明显;零售商竞争不仅有利于系统回收,也有利于零售商收益提高,但过于激烈的竞争不利于制造商收益增加。本研究结论对企业竞争决策和政府政策的制定具有一定的借鉴价值。

Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, the dynamic game decision-making models with and without reward-penalty mechanism(RPM) are built under asymmetric information, the results show that: Compared to the carbon emission(RPM),the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the product sale price effectively. Participating in recycling is conducive to improving retailer’s profits, what’s more, the retailer with H-type fixed recovery costs has obvious scale advantages, the greater the reward-penalty intensity, the greater the scale advantages under certain condition. The competition is not only benefits guiding WEEE recycling, but also good for improving retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on manufacturer is related to the RPM, and the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit. The conclusions have certain reference significance for enterprises competition decision-making and government policy making.