管理者权力与企业创新——基于高管激励的中介作用

Managerial Power and Corporate Innovation——Based on the Mediating Role of Executive Incentives

提高企业创新水平对构建创新型国家具有战略意义,而作为企业战略决策的主体,权力高的管理者对企业创新活动所产生的影响尚不明晰。以2010-2017年6453家深证A股上市公司为样本,基于普通最小二乘法探讨管理者权力、高管激励和企业创新三者间的因果关系。结果显示:管理者权力对企业创新有显著的正向影响,高管薪酬激励和股权激励起部分中介作用,根据Sobel检验证实中介效应显著并采用IV-GMM估计来消除管理者权力的内生性来源。进一步研究发现,在高新技术企业中,权力高的管理者对企业创新的促进作用更大,高管薪酬在管理者权力与企业创新之间具有完全中介效应,而高管股权激励不存在中介作用。研究为支持创新的公司治理实践提供有益启示。

Improving the level of enterprise innovation is of strategic significance to the construction of an innovative country. As the main body of enterprise strategic decision-making, it is unclear how powerful managers have influence on enterprise innovation activities. Taking 6453 Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-share listed companies as a sample from 2010 to 2017, it explores the causal relationship among managerial power, executive incentives and corporate innovation based on the ordinary least squares method. The results show that managerial power has a significant positive impact on corporate innovation. Executive compensation incentives and equity incentives play a part of the mediating role in the relationship between the two. The intermediary effect is verified by the Sobel test and an IV-GMM estimation was implemented to eliminate endogenous sources of managerial power. Further research found that in high-tech enterprises, powerful manager has a greater role in promoting corporate innovation. Executive compensation has a complete intermediary effect between managerial power and corporate innovation, while the executive equity incentives have no mediating effect. Research provides useful inspiration for corporate governance practices that support innovation.