地方政府债务风险控制三方演化博弈分析——基于财政分权视角

Three-party Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Risk Control of Local Government Debt——Based on the Fiscal Decentralization

当前我国地方政府债务风险总体可控,但风险隐患犹在,风险约束机制亟待完善。在中央政府财政分权背景下,文章基于演化博弈理论,构建了中央政府、地方政府、金融机构之间的三方演化博弈模型,研究博弈参与主体的策略选择以及整体的演化稳定策略,并进行仿真验证。研究发现:地方政府债务风险可以通过三方演化博弈的稳定策略加以控制,中央政府演化稳定策略的选择受其审计成本、惩罚额度和转移支付影响,地方政府演化稳定策略的选择受其负债成本、金融机构的监管成本与惩罚额度影响,而且中央政府与金融机构之间的稳定策略选择会相互影响。最后,文章结合当前财政分权的形势,从博弈参与方的视角给出政策建议,以期更好地控制地方政府债务风险,实现债务治理体系现代化。

Nowadays, the risk of local government debt could be controlled overall, but the hidden risk troubles still there, the risk control mechanization should be perfected. Under the central government fiscal decentralization background, based on evolutionary game theory, this article constructs a three-party evolutionary game model by central government, local government and financial institution.This article researches the gamers’ strategy choice and evolutionary stable strategy, and simulate proof the model. The research discovered the follow conclusions: local government debt risk can be controlled by evolutionary stable strategy;the key points to affects each evolutionary stable strategy not only includes central government’s audit cost, punishment, transfer payment, local government’s debt cost, and financial institute’s regulatory cost, punishment, but their evolution stable strategies also can mutual effect. Finally, this article combines the current fiscal decentralization situation, gives policy suggestions from the gamers’ angle, in order to control local government debt risk better, and make the debt governance system modernization come true.