摘要
本文通过对Q市7个拆迁村的田野调查和行为实验,研究房屋拆迁中村委会偏好特征对村民合作水平的影响。本文构建了一个包含异质性村委会的多主体博弈模型,提出研究假设,并进行实证检验。主要结论如下:当政府实施低补偿策略时,出于对村民利益的考虑以及对不公平的厌恶,利他型村委会会消极执行政府的拆迁工作,降低村民合作水平;当政府实施高补偿策略时,村委会成员利他程度越高,村民对拆迁合作水平越高。此外,村民过去的社会互动程度越强,以及对未来生活预期越好,都对拆迁合作水平有显著为正的影响。
This paper investigates the impact of village committees on villagers’ behavior in a government resettlement project. It first uses a multi-agent model with heterogeneous agents to examine the relationship between an altruistic village committee and the villagers’ cooperation. Then, the paper uses survey data and conducts a field experiment. It shows that when the government offers a low compensation plan, out of inequality aversion and villager’s interests, a more altruistic village committee tends to be less likely to be motivated to execute the demolition task, which reduces the cooperation level of villagers. Conversely, when the government offers a high compensation plan, a more altruistic village committee tends to have a more cooperative group of villagers. Other results show that villagers’ past social interactions and expectations for the future also significantly affect their resettlement cooperation level.
作者
黄凯南
李菁萍
Roland Cheo
乔元波
HUANG Kainan;LI Jingping;Roland CHEO;QIAO Yuanbo(The Center for Economic Research,Shandong University,Jinan,250100;Institute for Studies in County Development,Shandong University,Qingdao,266200)
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期67-80,共14页
China Economic Studies
基金
泰山学者工程专项经费(编号:TS201712006)
教育部2019青年基金项目(编号:19C10422042)的资助。
关键词
农村土地拆迁
村委会
多主体互动
利他性偏好
独裁者博弈
rural land resettlement
village committee
multi-agent interaction
altruistic preferences
the dictator game