企业道德风险治理的作用边界研究

Research on the functional boundary of moral hazard governance in enterprises

随着市场化改革的不断推进和创新驱动发展战略的实施,企业将得到更多政策支持而快速生长。与之相随,企业委托代理形式趋于多样化,为道德风险的治理带来新挑战。基于经典委托代理理论中脱离现实的行为人理性假设,对经典委托代理模型进行扩展,分析委托人的监督、代理人的保证、外部监管和信任四种不同委托代理机制下企业道德风险治理及作用边界。研究认为:如果监督成本由委托人共同承担,且分摊比例与委托人的企业道德风险层次特征相同,则委托人投资意向增加;只有当代理人的保证行为足够好,才能降低委托人期望,代理人才会选择持续勤奋;外部监督机制下,保证监管成本由代理人个人承担是监管效率的关键;委托人的信任对代理人有显著影响,而委托人的信任和市场弹性大小紧密相关。

With the continuous promotion of market-oriented reform and the implementation of innovation-driven development strategy,enterprises will get greater policy support and grow rapidly.At the same time,the forms of principal-agent in enterprises tend to be diversified,which brings new challenges to the governance of moral hazard.Based on the assumption of rationality of actor divorced from reality in the classical principal-agent theory,this paper expands the classical principal-agent model and analyzes the governance of moral hazard and functional boundary in enterprises under four different principal-agent mechanisms of principal’s supervision,agent’s assurance,external supervision and trust.Research suggests that if supervision cost is shared by principal and apportionment ratio is the same as the principal’s enterprise moral hazard level characteristics,the principal’s investment intention will increase.Only when the agent’s assurance behavior is good enough to lower the expectations of the principal,will the agent choose to continue to be diligent.Under the external supervision mechanism,the key to supervision efficiency is to ensure that the supervision cost is borne by the agent.The principal’s trust has a significant impact on the agent,and is closely related to market flexibility.