晋升激励抑制了地方官员环境注意力分配水平吗?

Does Promotion Incentive Inhibit the Level of Environmental Attention Allocation of Local Leader?

"晋升激励机制"一直广受关注,本文从"注意力分配"的视角考察了晋升激励对地方官员环境注意力分配行为的影响。研究发现,第一,晋升激励与地方官员环境注意力分配之间存在显著的"倒U形"关系,弱化年龄与任期的影响后二者之间可能存在边际效应递减的"渐进增长极限"关系;第二,地方环境污染防治呈现出一种"渐进均衡"的行动逻辑,长期来看地方官员环境注意力分配显著受过去相似行为的正激励,具有注意力分配"雪球效应";第三,晋升激励可分为压力等外生激励与年龄等内生激励,对地方官员环境注意力分配影响的重要性排序中,存在"压力>年龄>任期"现象;第四,政治周期对晋升激励与地方官员环境注意力分配之间的关系存在调节效应。

"promotion incentive mechanism"has been widely concerned.This paper examines the influence of promotion incentives of local officials on environmental attention allocation behavior from the perspective of"government attention allocation".It is found that,first,there is a significant"inverted U-shaped"relationship between local officials’promotion incentives and environmental attention allocation,and there may be a"gradual growth limit"relationship between them after weakening the influence of age and tenure;second,the prevention and control of local environmental pollution presents an action logic of"gradual equilibrium",and government environmental attention allocation is significantly positively motivated by past behavior and has the"snowball effect"of attention allocation;third,promotion incentives can be divided into exogenous incentives such as pressure and endogenous incentives such as age.In the order of importance of the impact on the distribution of environmental attention of officials,there is a rule of"pressure>age>tenure";fourth,political cycle has a moderating effect on the relationship between promotion incentives and environmental attention allocation of officials;fourth,political cycle has moderating effect on the relationship between promotion incentive and environmental attention allocation.