交易所年报问询能提升上市公司盈余质量吗?——基于深交所数据的实证分析

Can the Stock Exchange s Annual Report Inquiry Improve Earnings Quality of Listed Companies?An Empirical Analysis Based on Data of Shenzhen Stock Exchange

在上市公司公告年报后,交易所会组织专业人员对年报进行审核,并针对可能的疑问向上市公司发放年报问询函,要求公司回复并公开披露。基于这一制度背景,以深交所A股上市公司为研究对象,针对2014年至2017年间年报被问询的上市公司进行研究,发现在控制其他因素后,当年度年报被交易所问询的公司,其盈余管理程度更高、盈余质量更差,表明交易所在年报审核中是有的放矢的,关注到此类盈余质量更差的公司;同时发现,国有控股公司被问询的可能性低于非国有控股公司,表明交易所在年报问询中可能存在偏倚现象;进一步检验发现在年报被问询后,公司次年的盈余管理程度依然较高,盈余质量并未得到改善,年报问询这一非处罚性监管措施在改善盈余质量方面的监管效果有限。

After the listed company discloses the annual report,the exchange will organize professionals to review the annual report,and issue an annual report inquiry letter to the listed company for possible questions,requesting the company to reply and publicly disclose.Based on this institutional background,this paper takes the A-share listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the research object,and studies the listed companies whose annual reports were inquired from 2014 to 2017.The research finds that after controlling other factors,when the annual report is inquired by the exchange,the company has a higher degree of earnings management and a worsening earnings quality,which indicates that the exchange is targeted in the annual report review,focusing on companies with poorer earnings quality.It is also found the possibility of state-controlled listed companies being questioned is lower than non-state-owned holdings companies,indicating that there is a bias in the annual report inquiry of the exchange.Further test shows that after the annual report is inquired,the level of earnings management of the company in the next year is still high,and earnings quality has not been improved.The regulatory effect of annual report inquiry,a non punitive regulatory measure,is limited in improving earnings quality.