“递进”买方势力视角下两部收费制的规制机理研究--兼论政府反垄断部门应对策略

A Study of the Regulation Mechanism of the Two Charge Systems from the Perspective of“Progressive”Buyer Power--Concurrently Discussing the Countermeasures of the Government's Antimonopoly Department

近年来,两部收费制策略引发的反垄断案件频发,下游买方势力的逐渐增强使得纵向控制规制问题变得更加错综复杂。以往研究对买方势力动态变化影响企业策略性决策以及弱化上游市场竞争的问题关注不足。基于此,构建由上游在位者、潜在进入者和下游零售商组成的纵向产业链模型,以下游零售商买方势力的递进变化为切入点,深度剖析两部收费制策略的内在规制机理。结果表明:当下游企业没有买方势力或者具有较弱的抗衡势力时,两部收费制策略从本质上并未弱化上游市场竞争。然而,一旦潜在进入者无法打破在位者建立的进入壁垒,在位者便会充分利用其市场支配地位实施转售价格维持、搭售等一系列纵向控制手段,进而弱化上游市场竞争,以期实现“一家独大”。当下游企业主导交易时,在满足一定条件下,通道费合约会产生排他效应,其弱化上游竞争的程度有限。因此,政府反垄断部门制定规制政策应充分考虑企业纵向控制和逆纵向控制行为。

In recent years,the anti-monopoly cases caused by the two-part tariff strategy occur frequently,and the gradual enhancement of the power of downstream buyers makes the vertical control regulation problem more complicated.Previous studies have paid insufficient attention to the influence of dynamic changes in buyer power on strategic decisions of enterprises and weakening competition in the upstream market.Based on this,this paper constructs a vertical industry chain model consisting of upstream incumbents,potential entrants,and downstream retailers.Taking the progressive changes of downstream retailers'buyer power as the starting point,this article analyzes the two-part fee system strategy to weaken upstream market competition internal mechanism.The results show that when the downstream enterprises have no buyer power or weak counterbalance power,the two-part tariff strategy does not weaken the competition in the upstream market in essence.However,it should be emphasized that once potential entrants cannot break the entry barrier established by incumbents,incumbents will make full use of their dominant market position to implement a series of vertical control methods such as resale price maintenance and tie-in sale,thereby weakening the competition in the upstream market,in order to achieve monopoly.When the transaction is dominated by the downstream enterprise,under certain conditions,the channel fee contract will produce an exclusive effect,which will weaken the upstream competition to a limited extent.This paper extends the application of the existing longitudinal control theory to provide a more effective theoretical basis for the policy-making of the regulation department of corporate strategic decision.