反收购条款的强制性规范规制——以海利生物案为中心

Mandatory Regulation of Anti-takeover Clauses——Focusing on the Hile Bio-tech Case

我国监管机构与法院目前主要采用强制性规范规制反收购条款。2018年海利生物案将限制股东提名董事的反收购条款判定为无效。然而,反收购条款对股东利益的影响具有两面性,在理论上存在股东优位主义与董事优位主义之争,尚无定论。对于反收购条款的规制需要兼顾遏制投机性修订与保持章程适应力的二元目标,我国现阶段采强制性规范规制反收购条款容易造成规制不足与规制过度的问题。在规制策略的选择上,法院与监管者应当认识到作为"规则"策略的强制性规范与作为"标准"策略的司法审查以及强制性规范多元制定主体之间的替代关系,综合运用强制性规范与多种规制工具构建针对反收购条款的规制体系。

Chinese regulators and courts essentially employ mandatory rules to regulate anti-takeover clauses.In the 2018 Hile Bio-Tech case,the anti-takeover clause restricting shareholders’nomination of directors was ruled invalid.However,the anti-takeover clause bring both benefits and costs to shareholders.The theoretical debate between director primacy and shareholder primacy is far from being settled.The regulation of anti-takeover clause needs to consider the dual goals of curbing opportunistic amendment and maintaining adaptability of the corporate charters.In current China,regulating takeover defenses with mandatory rules may give rise to under-regulation and over-regulation.In the choice of regulatory strategies,courts and regulators should recognize the alternative relationship between mandatory norms as a"rule"strategy and judicial review as a"standard"strategy,as well as the multiple establishment subjects of mandatory norms,and comprehensively apply mandatory norms thus build a regulatory system for anti-takeover clauses with multiple regulatory tools.