摘要
员工持股计划是企业借助利益共享长效机制改善公司治理结构的重要手段,但实操层面不乏高管参与情形下的“另类减持”、盈余管理等现象。作为企业利益主体和内部信息人,高管参与员工持股计划与事后的异质性减持行为间是否存在“猫腻”?本文以员工持股减持择时的异质性为切入点,基于管理层自利行为视角深度剖析员工持股计划完成后减持行为的动机和市场反应。研究发现,向利益相关者传递正面信号是我国上市公司实施员工持股计划的重要动机;异质性择时会影响减持后的市场反应,且高管异质性特征会体现在减持的择时行为之中,员工持股计划减持的“猫腻”存在,即高管自利行为是员工持股计划减持择时的重要动机,并且“解锁立减”往往是内部人的短期套利行为,而“长期持有后减持”是内部人的“高位套现”行为。
Employee stock ownership plan(ESOP)is an important means for enterprises to improve corporate governance structure with the help of long-term mechanism of benefit sharing.However,in practice,there are many phenomena such as“alternative reduction”and earnings management in the case of executives′participation.As the main body of corporate interests and internal informants,is there any“tricky”relationship between executives′participation in ESOP and their subsequent heterogeneous reduction?Based on the heterogeneity of timing of ESOP reduction,this paper analyzes the motivation and market reaction of ESOP reduction from the perspective of management self-interest behavior.It is found that positive signal to stakeholders is an important motivation for Chinese listed companies to implement ESOP;heterogeneity timing will affect the market reaction after the reduction,and the heterogeneity characteristics of executives will be reflected in the timing behavior of the reduction.The“trick”of the reduction of ESOP exists,that is,the self-interest behavior of executives is an important motivation for the reduction of ESOP,and“unlocking and reducing”is often the short-term arbitrage behavior of insiders,while“reducing after long-term holding”is the main motivation of insiders“high level cash out”behavior.
作者
董珊珊
杜威
DONG Shan-shan;DU Wei(School of Management, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510000,China;Shenzhen Innovation Investment Group Co., Ltd., Shenzhen 518000,China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期88-95,共8页
Commercial Research
基金
“研究与阐释党的十九大精神”国家社科专项健全金融协调监管体系研究项目,项目编号:18VSJO72
中国博士后科学基金项目,项目编号:2019M663332。
关键词
ESOP
股票减持
利益共享
管理层自利
ESOP
stock reduction
benefit sharing
management self-interest